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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance and business decisions are constantly made in 
the name of shareholder value regardless of whether most shareholders 
actually benefit.1 Over the past thirty years, the supposed need to 
maximize shareholder value has helped to justify the financialization of 
corporations, where corporate resources and priorities have shifted 
towards the demands of financial markets, financial buyers, and financial 
measures, and away from other constituents, such as employees and 
communities. Shareholder value is a powerful idea; it is the cultural belief 
that the singular and primary purpose of the firm is to create value (in the 
form of a rising stock price) for the shareholders of a company, who are 
conceptualized as “the owners,” with an inherent right to the assets of the 
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 1. It is important to note that in the present moment, shareholding is starkly unequal in the U.S.: 
the top ten percent of households own eighty-four percent of all stock, and approximately half of all 
Americans own absolutely none at all. Such unevenness not only belies overblown claims of a 
shareholder democracy but also demonstrates the extent to which it is mainly the wealthy that directly 
benefit from shareholder value gains and claims. Of course, it is precisely the instability of share prices 
during the dot-com and 2008 financial crises that helped to push out many middle-class investors, who 
had less cushion to withstand financial losses. Moreover, as I argue in this Article, the corporate 
practices and decisions that are made in the name of generating shareholder value, especially in the 
short term, have often contributed (ironically) to the share-price volatility that has spooked middle-
class investors. As such, the basic workings of Wall Street have contributed to growing inequality 
even within the investor community. See Patricia Cohen, We All Have a Stake in the Stock Market, 
Right? Guess Again, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/business 
/economy/stocks-economy.html [https://perma.cc/MW69-EXL7]. 
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firm, and whose control of corporations presumably benefits the larger 
social economy. 
Beginning in earnest during the 1980s and continuing into the present 
moment, influential financial actors, led by Wall Street institutions, 
corporate takeover artists, and investment firms, have worked to downsize 
the corporation (cut costs and “delayer” as many stakeholders as possible) 
and redistribute these so-called savings to financiers, institutional 
shareholders, and financial advisors—at the cost of plummeting 
reinvestment in research and development, infrastructure, workers, 
communities, and market innovations, which require large, stable capital 
investments over time. As a result, corporations that undergo constant 
financial restructuring in the name of shareholder value are often at greater 
risk of bankruptcy, employee instability, and organizational volatility, as 
their long-term productivity is mined for short-term financial gain. 
Through claims made in the name of shareholder value primacy and 
immediacy, and the enactment of share price as the sole standard of 
measurement for corporate success, the entirety of the corporation was 
brought into the orbit of finance, reduced to a bundle of assets that could 
be extracted for narrow financial interests and gains. This particular 
cultural interpretation and deployment of shareholder value led firms to be 
thought of, and practiced on, as sites of short-term value extraction. 
Exemplified by restructured and financialized corporations, socio-
economic transformations have catalyzed a massive transfer of income to 
the wealthy few—engineered largely by the financial industry. Over the 
past forty years, dominant financial actors have successfully reframed the 
very purpose of corporations, converting them from stable sources of 
production and employment (at least for relatively privileged workers) 
into sites for the extraction of financial wealth. The effects of these 
practices and values have been staggering, as it is largely the siphoning of 
financial wealth from corporations that has enabled the richest one percent 
to capture nearly sixty percent of all income gains from 1993 to 2013.2 
These massive changes have been justified by the invocations and 
seductions of what I would call an origin myth—specifically, a set of 
assumptions about the origins of major corporations, the concept of 
proprietorship, the rights of ownership, and the roles of primary and 
secondary markets. Dominant financial interests have capitalized on a set 
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of historical fictions, often packaged and framed in terms of shareholder 
value, to mobilize and legitimize a set of practices that mainly benefit 
large-scale investors, such as private equity and leveraged buyout shops 
that purchase entire corporations, as well as institutions who “advise” in 
the name of shareholders. The result is that shareholder value—its 
interpretations and representations, its uses and abuses, its appropriations 
and mobilizations—has become a lightning rod for critics of 
socioeconomic inequality and advocates of corporate social responsibility. 
A growing chorus of voices, from critical legal scholars to climate justice 
advocates, is critiquing the “shareholder value myth” for its contributions 
to unsustainable corporate practices and financial crises—even as many 
lodge full-throated defenses of this same myth.3 
In this context, then, it is crucial to unpack and differentiate the 
critiques of practices done in the name of shareholder value that mainly 
benefit dominant finance from critiques of the shareholder value myth per 
se. Oftentimes, in debates over shareholder value, the overwhelming 
power of the financial sector to push its particular version of shareholder 
value and to shape the terms of these debates goes unnoticed. At the same 
time, it would be naïve to presume that the shareholder value myth—in 
particular, the core ideology of shareholder value primacy, which rests on 
concepts of shareholder ownership—is not somehow conducive to, and 
mobilized in the service of, large financial interests. 
The work of this Article, then, is to shed light on these debates, to 
locate problematic appropriations of shareholder value ideologies, and to 
disentangle abuses of power from more capacious, though still limited, 
interpretations of shareholder value. To do so, it is necessary to go beyond 
the shorthand and hackneyed invocations of “shareholder value” to gain a 
deeper understanding of the ideological building blocks and the 
underlying cultural and historical assumptions, which imbue declarations 
of shareholder value with such primacy and generative force. In this 
endeavor, this Article will engage the taken-for-granted assumptions that 
somehow corporations “belong” to shareholders because shareholders, in 
turn, “birthed” them, and, in the same vein, that investors and financial 
markets in general are the originators of foundational and productive 
capital that has allowed corporations to thrive and created jobs. It will 
challenge origin myths and historical misrecognitions of financial 
markets, shareholding, and proprietorship that have allowed dominant 
finance to justify its own practices in the name of shareholder value when, 
in fact, the overall stability and productivity of the underlying corporations 
                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Sublime Myths: An Essay in Honor of the Shareholder Value 
Myth and the Tooth Fairy, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 911 (2013); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments 
for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002). 
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have been damaged (or liquidated) over the past forty years, and 
“everyday” shareholders hardly benefit as much as is touted. 
Part I of this Article analyzes some of the contemporary critiques of, 
and debates around, shareholder value in order to illustrate why many of 
these contestations demonstrate underlying gaps or problematic assertions 
in the history and politics of shareholder value, especially if they are 
delimited by the narrow legal frames and neoliberal assumptions of 
corporations. It also provides the context necessary to explicate and 
ground why shareholder primacy and ownership assumptions are 
historically and legally flawed, and how financial values and assumptions 
continue to be championed (and financial power elided), despite the recent 
implosions of shareholder value. Part II expands upon several leading 
scholars’ work in showing the paradoxical and ahistorical nature of the 
shareholder ownership assumption and the conflation of primary and 
secondary financial markets. Throughout, this Article attempts to 
differentiate and disentangle multiple problems with the shareholder value 
interpretation by emphasizing Wall Street’s undue influence, the myth and 
ideology of shareholder value primacy, and the intersections between 
them. 
I. BACKGROUND: SHAREHOLDER VALUE CONTESTATIONS 
It would not be an exaggeration to state that shareholder value has 
been business and legal orthodoxy since the 1980s. It was not until the 
global financial crisis of 2008, instigated in large part by Wall Street 
financial institutions, that doubts about the self-evidence of shareholder 
value began to bubble into the mainstream—beyond the circles of 
economic justice advocates, social critics, and critical legal, cultural, and 
social scientific scholars. For example, in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, Harvard Business School scholars Rakesh Khurana and Nitin 
Nohria argued the following: 
To regain society’s trust, we believe that business leaders must 
embrace a way of looking at their role that goes beyond their 
responsibility to the shareholder to include a civic and personal 
commitment to their duty as institutional custodians. In other words, 
it is time that management became a profession.4 
Even the former CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch, one of the 
strictest adherents to shareholder value primacy, who deployed that logic 
to radically restructure his firm through massive layoffs and redistribution 
of “savings” to shareholders, declared, “[o]n the face of it, shareholder 
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BUS. REV., Oct. 2008, at 70. 
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value is the dumbest idea in the world. . . . Shareholder value is a result, 
not a strategy . . . Your main constituencies are your employees, your 
customers and your products.”5 
The recent surprise announcement by the Business Roundtable on 
the “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation” has generated speculation 
that the era of shareholder value primacy is waning. Composed of almost 
200 leading CEOs of major U.S. corporations, the Business Roundtable—
pivoting away from its own proclaimed shareholder value orthodoxy, 
which had unequivocally stated since 1997 that the singular purpose of all 
corporations is simply to generate shareholder value—pledged that its new 
purpose was to help create an economy that could “serve[] all 
Americans.”6 While being mindful of the nationalist undertones borne of 
the present moment, the “reframing” of the purpose of corporations 
towards “the benefit of all stakeholders—customers, employees, suppliers, 
communities, and shareholders”7 is an important move away from a 
short-sighted and short-term insistence on shareholder primacy. 
At the same time, it is important to approach this apparent merging 
of stakeholder and shareholder interests with some caution. Historically, 
when stakeholder and shareholder interests have been translated into one 
another, or conflated, this move has led to the eventual undermining of 
other stakeholders’ interests in favor of declarations of shareholder value. 
It would thus be advisable to be circumspect as to the limits of such a 
declaration, as well as to the problems that can ensue when multiple 
interests are laid side by side, as if they were nonhierarchical.8 In other 
words, we have been through precisely this kind of reframing before, and 
a particular version of shareholder value won. 
When the Business Roundtable was first constituted in 1972, during 
the peak era of managerial capitalism—when corporations were 
understood to be long-term social institutions, albeit hierarchical, 
exclusive, and paternalistic—it declared “social responsibility” to be one 
of several core functions of a corporation. And yet, soon afterwards and 
into the 1980s, the Business Roundtable began to justify long-term 
investments, a commitment to stakeholders, and social responsibility itself 
in terms of shareholder value. This deference was due, in part, to the 
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https://www.ft.com/content/294ff1f2-0f27-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac (last visited Jan. 23, 2020). 
 6. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That 
Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Business Roundtable 
Redefines the Purpose], https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-
purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/R865-
HM4A]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. 
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growing dominance of a financialized worldview of the corporation, 
where both Wall Street and neoliberal economists began to converge on 
demands that short-term stock price appreciation serves as the key means 
through which the agents of corporations (understood to be managers) 
served the interests of the owners of corporations (understood to be the 
shareholders). Consequently, to justify a more stakeholder-oriented, 
social-entity view of the corporation to the growing chorus of shareholder 
value advocates, proponents of managerial or stakeholder capitalism 
balanced the tension between the immediate insistence to “unlock 
shareholder value now” with long-term investments in everything from 
research and development to employee benefits by arguing that all such 
investments would, in time, generate shareholder value. Of course, such a 
reductive framing of the multiplicity of the corporation (its responsibility 
to society at large) was, in hindsight, a slippery slope. This framing was 
intended to anticipate and fit within the relatively narrow frame and 
agenda of shareholder value. As I have argued elsewhere, “[t]he danger of 
this kind of discursive translation is the insertion of shareholder value as 
baseline measurement for all corporate practice. With some temporal 
flexibility, stock price was seen as having the ability to stand for and to 
symbolize all the positive results of corporate choices.”9 One could argue 
that by adopting the language of shareholder value, social entity 
proponents helped pave the way for the soon-to-be dominant view of 
corporations as primarily financial entities. 
The Business Roundtable’s balancing act between shareholders and 
stakeholders in the 1980s and 1990s is directly mirrored in its 2019 
position. What is crucial to remember is that when shareholder value is 
framed as the most important measure and shareholders are viewed as key 
constituents, attempts to negotiate these tensions have historically 
collapsed the interests of stakeholders into those of shareholders—and 
shareholders continue to be problematically understood as the owners of 
corporations. Until this ideological assumption of ownership is 
challenged, shareholder value advocates will continue to claim for 
shareholders a foundational right to the corporation and advance the 
(illogical) argument that a focus on stock price should theoretically benefit 
all constituents.10 It is thus important to recognize the limits of the 
Business Roundtable’s recent declaration, as throughout the 1980s and 
into the 1990s they acknowledged the existence of multiple 
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theoretical, academic, and on-the-ground virtues of shareholder value have been increasingly 
challenged since the Great Recession. See Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose, supra note 6. 
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stakeholders—while still subordinating multiple agendas to the pursuit of 
shareholder value. 
Of course, the discursive contestations and translations around 
shareholder value also evince an architecture of policies, values, decisions, 
and institutions that has been structured on shareholder value. Shareholder 
value, after all, is both a myth and a social fact.11 Here, it would be useful 
to analyze recent legal debates between a defender of shareholder value, 
Yale Law School professor Jonathan Macey, and one of its most 
influential and strident critics, Lynn Stout, a former professor at Cornell 
Law School. This debate is directly instructive of both the common pitfalls 
in mainstream and academic debates about shareholder value, and the 
extent to which the ongoing reproduction of particular interpretations of 
shareholder value depends upon an entire assemblage of underlying ideas, 
assumptions, and practices that must be challenged. 
In Sublime Myths: An Essay in Honor of the Shareholder Value Myth 
and the Tooth Fairy,12 a tongue-in-cheek and rather reproachful review of 
Lynn Stout’s book The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting 
Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public, Macey 
deploys dominant and problematic assumptions to criticize Stout for 
staging a feigned controversy.13 Specifically, he is confused as to why she 
would frame shareholder value primacy as a problem, since, as he puts it, 
shareholder value is “but a sheep in wolf’s clothing.”14 As Macey 
rationalizes, since managers hardly do enough to maximize shareholder 
value—there is no direct legal requirement to do so, nor are they forced to 
take any “extreme or socially destructive actions” to achieve it—it can 
hardly be dubbed a problem or even a primacy, only a laudable 
“aspiration.”15 Falling prey to the narrow fiction of managers as self-
                                                     
 11. Anthropologists have long analyzed and approached “myth” not so much as “alternative 
facts” or “fake news,” but as powerful narratives and ideologies that shape community identities, 
meaning, and social organization. See generally BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, MAGIC, SCIENCE AND 
RELIGION AND OTHER ESSAYS (Robert Redfield ed., 1948); Sylvia J. Yanagisako & Carol L. Delaney, 
Naturalizing Power, in NATURALIZING POWER: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST CULTURAL ANALYSIS 1, 1 
(Sylvia Yanagisako & Carol Delaney eds., 1995). In a related vein, we do not examine and understand 
“facts” in a vacuum: engaging with the term “social facts,” we analyze how and in what ways 
collectively generated beliefs, societal structures, and uneven power relations shape individual and 
social understandings of truth, facts, and objectivity, and what counts as such. See generally Emile 
Durkheim, What Is a Social Fact?, in THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 1, 50 (Steven Lukes ed., 
1965); Karen Ho & Jillian R. Cavanaugh, What Happened to Social Facts?, 121 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 160 (2019). 
 12. See generally Macey, supra note 3. This title betrays his presumption that the shareholder 
value myth is as “beneficent” as that of the tooth fairy. 
 13. Here, I mainly focus on Lynn Stout’s scholarship with respect to Jonathan Macey’s critique. 
In the next Part, I engage with her important work more directly. 
 14. Macey, supra note 3, at 912. 
 15. Id. at 912, 920. 
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serving agents of shareholders (who are presumed to be the true principals 
of the corporation), Macey argues that despite managerial lip service to 
shareholder value, often belied by their practices, the “shareholder wealth 
maximization model” at least serves as a countervailing check to prevent 
managers from “steal[ing] from the company with impunity.”16 Besides, 
he continues, since Stout claims that “shareholder primacy is a myth,” then 
“she must be wrong in her claim that it is a serious threat or problem. 
Myths do not pose real threats,” as they are only “imaginary.”17 
Meanwhile, Lynn Stout calls shareholder value, specifically 
shareholder value primacy and its theoretical underpinnings, “myths” for 
strategic reasons.18 She recognizes that part of what continues to animate 
this theory and set of priorities is the assumption that shareholder value 
primacy is akin to “truth,” problematically assumed to be enshrined in 
corporate law and charter (which she debunks). Dubbing it “myth” serves 
to challenge its dominance and deconstruct its power. Moreover, any 
cultural anthropologist would certainly challenge Macey on his misplaced 
understanding of myth: its constructedness, its historical contingency, and 
its origins in narrative do not diminish its social power and influence. One 
need only look to the example of race: the fact that it is a social 
construction does not make it any less real. In fact, race is probably the 
quintessential example of a myth—an imaginary concept shaped by 
historical and material interests—that has had world-changing and 
ongoing structural effects, illustrating the mutual constitution of discourse 
and practice. To claim that myth can pose no real threat is therefore 
contrary to social fact and anthropological understanding. 
And yet, Macey’s confusion regarding the conundrum—how can 
shareholder value primacy be harmful to shareholders themselves (not to 
mention corporations)19—is understandable. Why blame shareholder 
                                                     
 16. Id. at 920. 
 17. Id. at 913, 923. 
 18. LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 14 (2012). 
 19. There is longstanding and substantive evidence that short-term shareholder value primacy 
has damaged and dismantled corporations as social institutions and has often undermined long-term 
stock price stability and appreciation. As business and management scholar Gerald Davis has 
demonstrated, “after two decades of ‘shareholder value,’” public corporations have faced heightened 
turnover and faced demise: “only three” corporations “are left” on the Dow Jones industrial index 
from the original thirty. Gerald F. Davis, After the Ownership Society: Another World Is Possible, in 
MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS, 331, 333 (Paul M. 
Hirsch & Michael Lounsbury eds., 2010). “The number of public corporations in the United States in 
2009 was half what it had been in 1997,” Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means 
Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1134 (2011), and “thanks to two decades of restructuring 
driven by a quest for shareholder value . . . . the career ladder had been replaced by the career Roach 
Motel as another unexpected consequence of the shareholder value movement,” Gerald F. Davis, The 
Rise and Fall of Finance and the End of the Society of Organizations, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 27, 
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value for the ineffectiveness of multiple actors, especially corporate 
executives?20 He takes particular issue with Stout’s example of the 
massive BP oil spill, where she hints that “shareholder value thinking” 
influenced the company’s cost-cutting and disregard for safety standards, 
which in turn catalyzed the resulting explosion, ecological devastation, 
and decimation of the gulf (not to mention BP’s stock price).21 Yet, Macey 
is dissatisfied with Stout’s explanation: 
[E]ven if one were to fantasize that some misguided notion of 
shareholder value maximization on the part of BP management 
somehow was to blame for the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the 
Gulf of Mexico, it does not stand to reason that shareholder value 
maximization in general is at fault. In fact, the opposite is true. If BP 
was trying to maximize value for shareholders, it failed miserably. It 
failed to such an extent that shareholders in BP . . . can sue BP for its 
failure to adequately protect shareholders’ wealth . . . .22 
The issue here is a gap in analysis and, I would argue, insufficient 
attention to financial interests, actors, and institutions, which are key 
players in these developments. 
While Macey is correct to point out that shareholder value per se is 
not always the culprit, and while Stout is even more on target when she 
points out more specifically that “shareholder value primacy and thinking” 
are at fault, neither focus their attention on the elephant in the room: Wall 
Street financiers, investors, and advisors, whose role as spokespeople of 
the financial markets and guardians of stock price primacy often serves to 
prevent scrutiny. Their continual encouragement of and engagement in 
expedient financial practices (such as increasing corporate debt loads) 
often undermine the long-term sustainability and stability of the firms they 
advise, not to mention shareholder value. In other words, the 
contradictions of shareholder value are thrown into sharp relief for a 
                                                     
35 (2009). Lynn Stout makes a similar argument. She writes, “Corporate America’s mass embrace of 
shareholder value thinking has not translated into better corporate or economic performance. The past 
dozen years have seen a daisy chain of corporate disasters, from massive frauds . . . to the near-failure 
and subsequent costly taxpayer bailout of many of our largest financial institutions . . . .” STOUT, supra 
note 18, at 11. 
 20. Corporate executives do not always do a competent job of creating shareholder value over 
time (meaning shareholder value is proclaimed but not always enacted). While shareholder value has 
the potential to be capacious and could be practiced and interpreted in ways that benefit multiple 
parties, the issue is that managers are incentivized to be short-term, and oftentimes mortgage the long-
term stability and productivity of the organization. Of course, the fact that many high-level corporate 
executives are compensated through stock options and thus are themselves “shareholders” should give 
defenders of shareholder value pause and encourage them to ruminate about the potentially short-term, 
institutionally-extractive effects of shareholder value approaches. 
 21. STOUT, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 22. Macey, supra note 3, at 922. 
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number of reasons. The financial market actors charged with promoting 
and protecting shareholder value often undermine or destabilize 
companies, preventing them from generating sustained shareholder value 
in the long term. Corporate executives and managers, through stock option 
compensation plans, are themselves aligned with financial markets rather 
than the long-term sustenance of the institution. The very discourse and 
assumptions undergirding shareholder value are themselves based on 
problematic assumptions and origin myths of ownership that narrow the 
purview of corporations and misrecognize their history. Understanding the 
multiple reasons why shareholder value is so contested—why critics often 
find it difficult to pinpoint the reasons for their discontent and why 
proponents of it often experience unsatisfactory trajectories, outcomes, or 
deferrals—is therefore crucial in order to disentangle the multiple 
practices mobilized in the name of shareholder value. I now turn to the 
problematic conceptions embedded in assumptions of shareholder value. 
Returning to Macey, we see evidence of these assumptions. Despite 
his concurrence with Stout that shareholder value is an ideology,23 he holds 
steadfast to the notion, which he presumes to be an underlying truth, that 
somehow shareholders’ privileged claims to and status within the 
corporation are legitimated by the assumption that they contributed 
original capital to corporations at their founding.24 In fact, Macey defends 
shareholder value because he argues that “shareholder money” is “required 
to capitalize the corporation,” and that, therefore, corporate executives and 
directors should not have broad leeway, according to the business 
judgment rule, to manage the corporation according to multiple shifting 
demands, as they would otherwise be “free to do virtually anything they 
want with and to shareholders’ money and never have to say they are sorry 
to shareholders, courts, workers, or anybody else.”25 While “anybody else” 
is thrown in to conjure safety in numbers, Macey’s core presumption is 
that the corporation is really just an instantiation of “shareholders’ 
money.”26 This origin myth has generated its own effects and logics that, 
I would argue, have warped the narrative order of things: the myth of 
shareholder ownership has in turn engendered a logic of entrepreneurship 
based on an ahistorical misreading of shareholder risk taking. 
For example, Macey argues that downplaying shareholder value 
primacy would eliminate the all-important corporate activity of “risk 
taking”: 
                                                     
 23. See id at 917. 
 24. See id. at 912. 
 25. Id. at 921. 
 26. See id. at 917. 
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If we diminish, much less eliminate, shareholders from our list of 
constituencies that corporate managers are supposed to serve, we are 
left only with the interests of fixed claimants, i.e., those claimants 
like workers, creditors, and local communities who enter into specific 
contractual relationships with corporations. For solvent companies, 
meeting the obligations owed to these constituencies does not require 
marginal risk taking. Marginal risk taking benefits only shareholders. 
Thus, Professor Stout’s eliminating the myth of shareholder value 
also would eliminate the reality of risk taking, which is the critical 
component of entrepreneurship.27 
As I will unpack further in the next Part, equating current shareholder 
equity with the risk-taking, entrepreneurial “founder-capital” that 
germinated the corporation is a historical misreading that confuses 
primary markets with secondary financial markets. Historically, most 
shareholders only engage with corporations through shares introduced and 
traded in the secondary markets after corporations have already been 
founded and are already operational through their own retained earnings. 
In fact, the anthropologist Alexandra Ouroussoff has demonstrated that the 
intense pressure corporate managers face from financiers and financial 
advisors to extracted short-term shareholder value has actually prevented 
corporations from taking risks, as shareholder primacy privileges 
immediate returns, not the long-term risks necessary for innovation.28 The 
dense assemblage of seemingly self-evident logics scaffolded onto 
shareholder value necessarily blinds scholars to its mythical qualities, to 
recognizing that shareholder value is a myth imbued with great social 
power. 
II. CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTION OF  
SHAREHOLDER OWNERSHIP 
The basic assumption of shareholder ownership, that shareholders 
are foundational to the corporation, must be actively challenged by 
scholarship from multiple disciplines, in a variety of business and industry 
circles, and in the area of public education and understanding. For 
example, June Carbone and Nancy Levit, in a recent 2017 Minnesota Law 
Review article entitled The Death of the Firm, insightfully observe that 
“the firm as entity is disappearing as a unit of legal analysis” and argue 
that it is “an ideological shift in the treatment of the firm” that has 
collapsed and reduced the firm into a social organization “greater than the 
sum of its parts,” beholden to multiple stakeholders, into “the narrowly 
                                                     
 27. Id. at 920. 
 28. See ALEXANDRA OUROUSSOFF, WALL STREET AT WAR: THE SECRET STRUGGLE FOR THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2010). 
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defined interests of a company’s immediate owners,” who turn to the 
financial markets to measure the value of their holdings.29 The entity is 
continually liquidated, so to speak, in order to maximize in the name of 
the shareholder. While Carbone and Levit importantly and astutely 
question the societal impact of this ideological turn in the purpose and 
governance of a corporation, they too hold intact the core notion of 
ownership, specifically that shareholders do, in fact, “own” the 
corporation. 
In this vein, it might be instructive to further engage and extend the 
work of the legal scholar Lynn Stout, who had been at the forefront of the 
critique against these interrelated, co-dependent logics. In a 2002 Southern 
California Law Review article, Stout maintained that the “worst” yet “most 
common” defense of shareholder primacy is the “bad argument” that “the 
public corporation ‘belongs’ to its shareholders.”30 The logic is as follows: 
because shareholders own the corporation, they are entitled to all the 
firm’s earnings and assets, and moreover, the managers must work to 
maximize the owners’ wealth through stock price appreciation. It is, 
therefore, important to question and dismantle the building blocks of this 
logic. 
Stout points out that the primacy of shareholder value depends on a 
problematic conflation: shareholders own shares or stock, a corporate 
security, not the corporation itself.31 Given this social fact, we must then 
ask ourselves what the ownership of a stock means, and what the rights 
conferred upon this kind of ownership are. Again, Stout argues that these 
ownership rights are “quite limited,” as public company shareholders 
neither have the “right to exercise control over the corporation’s assets” 
nor the “right to help themselves to the firm’s earnings”; these are decided 
by the board of directors.32 As Stout further clarified in 2013: 
Although laymen sometimes have difficulty understanding the point, 
corporations are legal entities that own themselves, just as human 
entities own themselves. What shareholders own are shares, a type of 
contract between the shareholder and the legal entity that gives 
shareholders limited legal rights. In this regard, shareholders stand on 
equal footing with the corporation’s bondholders, suppliers, and 
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employees, all of whom also enter contracts with the firm that give 
them limited legal rights.33 
Empirically then, “equity holders” have a similar status to 
bondholders, and yet the presumption of ownership, not to mention their 
privileged positionality as central claimants and direct principals of the 
corporation, holds steadfast. As Stout astutely observes, “The notion that 
corporate law requires directors, executives, and employees to maximize 
shareholder wealth simply is not true. There is no solid legal support for 
the claim that directors and executives in U.S. public corporations have an 
enforceable legal duty to maximize shareholder wealth. The idea is 
fable.”34 
As such, it is important to unpack why such a problematic claim has 
had such enduring power, as well as how the deployment of shareholder 
value primacy since the 1980s—while entirely new and unprecedented in 
its reach and its generation of socio-economic inequality—depended on 
the coming together of multiple and longstanding discursive strands from 
finance, the state, academia, neoliberal and conservative ideologies, and 
so on. Here, I track these convergences. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a particular strand of neoliberal 
and financial economic ideology developed in academia to address 
contestations around corporate governance tilted the narrative of corporate 
purpose in Wall Street’s favor by advocating for the righteousness of the 
“shareholder-as-owner” myth. Perhaps the most influential academic 
catalyst was Milton Friedman’s ubiquitously cited, infamous argument in 
The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, where he 
presents the following ideas and beliefs as facts: that shareholders own 
corporations; that corporations are created solely by shareholders’ money; 
that shareholders are the ultimate employers; and, therefore, that not acting 
primarily in the interest of shareholders betrays the very tenets of a free 
society and is tantamount to “preaching pure and unadulterated 
socialism.”35 
In addition, financial economists and business school professors 
promoted a view of the corporation called “agency theory”: seductive in 
its simplicity, it was a theoretical model based on an origin myth 
concerning shareholders’ historically fictive role in the founding of 
modern corporations, and promoted the notion that managers should be 
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the “agents” of the true principals of a corporation, which were presumed 
to be the shareholders. The seductive appeal of this seemingly tight and 
coherent argument—which fulfilled capitalist, individualist, and 
democratic impulses because the owners of capital received the spoils of 
industry, and yet technically anyone could buy stock and be an owner—
cannot be underestimated. Importantly, Lynn Stout critiques this ensuing 
generation of neoclassical and neoliberal economic adherents who 
repeated Friedman’s theoretical assertions so constantly and uncritically 
that these ideological arguments took on the status of fact.36 
It would not be too far-fetched to state that the Friedman article, 
which begat the perennially-cited 1976 Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling article Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure, established a genealogy of the financialized 
firm that, through the iterative process, made shareholder value seem 
natural and self-evident.37 Both articles, and countless others, promoted 
the “erroneous belief that shareholders ‘own’ corporations” and the 
corollary idea that shareholders are the corporation’s residual claimants, 
thereby building up from these problematic assumptions an ideological 
foundation for imperatives of shareholder maximization and narratives of 
managerial betrayal.38 As legal scholars such as Lynn Stout and 
sociologists such as Frank Dobbin and Dirk Zorn have noticed, the key 
proponents of these seductive ideas had little to no background in 
corporate law or in the daily workings and navigations of industry and 
business. As such, they “failed to capture the real economic structure of 
public companies with directors, executives, shareholders, debtholders, 
and other stakeholders”39; these theories were ironically “widely 
influential, considering that [they were] cooked up by a couple of business 
school professors at the University of Rochester and not by a titan of 
industry.”40 
Given the enduring hold of the myth of shareholder ownership, it 
comes as no surprise that it works in concert with and influences two other 
legally erroneous arguments that are used to uphold the notion of 
shareholder primacy. For example, Stout argues that the shareholders as 
“residual claimants” argument is a faulty rationale used to construct a 
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privileged position for shareholders. She explains that, in fact, 
“[s]hareholders are residual claimants only when failed companies are 
being liquidated in bankruptcy,” and that, thus, this framing should not be 
used to determine corporate purpose in the regular course of business.41 
Specifically, “[t]he law applies different rules to healthy companies, where 
the legal entity is its own residual claimant, meaning that the entity is 
entitled to keep its profits and to use them as its board of directors sees 
fit.”42 Similarly, a corollary legal error that similarly supports the mistaken 
claim that corporations must be governed strictly for the benefit of 
shareholders is the belief that corporate executives serve as agents for the 
shareholder, who is understood to be the principal, when, in fact, there is 
no right of the latter to control the former.43 This understanding is based 
upon a historical misconception that shareholders founded corporations, 
and thus that all ensuing stakeholders must serve shareholder needs. 
Specifically, Stout argues that “[s]hareholders lack the legal authority to 
control directors or executives”44 and “[t]he business judgement rule 
ensures that, contrary to popular belief, the managers of public companies 
have no enforceable legal duty to maximize shareholder values.”45 
Shareholder primacy is thus, a societal, academic, and managerial 
choice promoted by financiers and other powerful actors, but “not a legal 
requirement.”46 There must, therefore, be other factors and explanations, 
beyond the law, to explain how the ideologies and interests of Wall Street, 
shareholder value advocates, and neoliberal economists became common 
sense in American business. Additional historical and societal 
intersections and contexts are at play. It is no accident that agency theory 
and particular framings of capitalist ownership have acquired such 
authority in American society, despite their failure to address inequalities. 
To further understand how shareholder value arguments gained 
traction as part of larger historical and socio-economic processes, 
mobilizations, interests, and events, it is crucial to engage with historian 
Julia Ott’s work on the history of capitalism in the United States. In When 
Wall Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an Investor’s Democracy, Ott 
argues that financial and “equity” ownership through the selling of bonds 
and stocks has long captured the American imagination and fueled and 
legitimated conservative and nationalist notions of property ownership and 
wealth accumulation. She painstakingly shows how, in the early twentieth 
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century, many of the largest corporations, such as AT&T, capitalized on 
Americans’ newfound patriotic interest in securities (fueled by the sale of 
Liberty Bonds during WWI) to promote the sale of corporate stock.47 
Using the rationale of “shareholder democracy”—that the nation consisted 
of a community of property owners—these companies sought to roll back 
the regulatory state and to curtail protections for employees by postulating 
to the public that, since employees and others could become shareholders 
and shareholders were “owners,” corporations did not need to extend 
protections to these potential “proprietors” (of stock), who were in reality 
mostly “propertyless wage-laborers.”48 
Of course, during this time, owners of a few shares with meager 
protections did not have access to wealth accumulation as did individual 
property owners of land or business, and yet, in order to market and 
promote the purchase of securities among the masses, the financial 
securities industry leveraged their deep-seated aspirations to construct a 
false similarity between the ownership of shares and the ownership of the 
means of production. As the flourishing pre-1929 stock market masked 
growing inequality, Ott shows how shareholder value maximization came 
to be utilized by large corporations, with significant support and buy-in 
from the state, to tell stories of mass investment, harmonize class interests, 
and deflect corporations from regulatory oversight. Even in the wake of 
the Great Depression, which dealt shareholder capitalism a severe blow, 
New Deal policies and compromises not only rescued American 
capitalism but also rehabilitated the notion of mass investment in the 
financial markets as a way for key players to continue promoting securities 
ownership, capital investments, and dominant notions of property and 
proprietorship.49 
This historical context of shareholder value justifications in the name 
of investor democracy is germane because it illustrates the multiple ways 
in which assumptions about ownership, proprietorship, and property have 
been mobilized in situations that were often quite different from each 
other, and where one tenuous claim was often used to give strength to 
another tenuous claim. Specifically, the equating of corporate stock 
ownership with independent proprietorship in order to solidify cultural and 
economic legitimacy for capitalism in the early-to-mid-twentieth century 
reveals two origin myths. First, there was a paucity of individual 
proprietorships, as the stark and growing inequalities in the U.S. between 
Wall Street financiers and corporate leaders on the one hand and the 
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majority of employees and the left-out masses on the other50 were more 
characteristic of the time. Second, stock ownership allowed neither 
proprietorship nor control of the company itself, as shareholding of public 
corporations was created—in the first instance—to enable owners of stock 
to “play” in the stock market. This historical context is crucial to 
unpacking shareholder value origin myths. 
The stock market in the U.S. was deliberately created to separate 
stockholding from the day-to-day business of the corporation, and to 
separate stockholders from control of the firm and access to its retained 
earnings. Stockholders engaged in the separated space of the stock market, 
not the corporation itself, and therefore, “the very notion of returning to a 
time when shareholders owned and controlled their enterprises is itself a 
fantasy.”51 In fact, shareholders historically did not invest in the value-
creating capabilities of the company. They traded in the secondary 
markets, in the realm of finance and the capital markets—Wall Street’s 
domain—where liquidity, short-termism, and separation from the 
everyday life and control of the corporation were the historical context. It 
is instructive to note that the stock market was a vehicle that allowed 
founders to cash out after corporations were already a going concern; the 
secondary markets (i.e., the stock market) did not seed the corporation. 
The excision of this history is crucial to the belief in the shareholder’s 
righteous possession of the spoils of the company. It all depends on the 
incorrect assumption that shareholders were actually the original fountain 
of capital, the original investors who created the innovation-producing 
capabilities of the modern corporation. In fact, the modern corporation was 
built and sustained from retained earnings, the work of multiple 
stakeholders, especially employees, and various inputs from founders; 
most shareholders entered the picture after the fact, after corporations were 
already a going concern, and mainly exchanged shares in the secondary 
markets, with liquidity being their primary concern. 
Moreover, despite financial interests rallying in the name of 
shareholders in the 1980s and beyond, “Wall Street and corporate 
executives historically advocated for widespread shareholding, not as a 
vehicle to give shareholders control (as public shareholding was 
understood and actualized to be a dilution of control), but as cultural 
rehabilitation” to promote greater societal buy-in for multiple capitalist 
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projects.52 In other words, the past forty years of intense financialization 
advocated for a return to a “past that never was.”53 The 1980s corporate 
takeover movement was framed as a restoration of shareholders’ 
ownership and control of corporations. It catalyzed and operationalized 
the shareholder value worldview by tearing corporations from the multiple 
stakeholder communities in which they were embedded and placing them 
in a commoditized space of exchange where their stock price became their 
single most important aspect. Because it was only through appreciation of 
the stock value that corporations could avoid being taken over (higher 
stock prices make a firm more expensive to purchase and thus offer some 
protection from takeovers), the takeover movement effectively promoted 
stock price as the singular obsession of the corporate world.  
Of course, institutional investors on Wall Street have long viewed 
corporations as stock prices in portfolios because, as spokespeople, 
advisors, and players in the financial markets, their viewpoint has been 
shaped by the stock market. Stock price has long been finance’s vantage 
point: the difference between most of the twentieth century and the 
contemporary moment is that this worldview has only recently become 
pervasive and dominant. The stock market and the corporation were 
historically separated and protected from each other. Wall Street 
specialized in the stock market, meaning that it played with stocks and 
owned shares, not corporations themselves. It was only with the 1980s 
takeover movement that Wall Street ideologies crossed over to serve as a 
rationale for reshaping corporate governance in the name of the 
shareholders. Successive takeover movements fueled the past four decades 
of financial deal-making, as corporations were increasingly treated as sites 
of shareholder value extraction. Wall Street simply did not have the power 
to do this before the Chicago School of neoclassical economic thought, led 
by Friedman, and agency theory, championed by Jensen and Meckling, 
provided academic legitimacy to the project,54 and before the flood of 
investment money that came into mutual, pension, and retirement accounts 
gave Wall Street billions of additional dollars to bolster its claims to speak 
for all investors. 
The origin myths of shareholder value primacy and ownership were 
also made possible, dare I say subsidized, by the State. The extent to which 
the U.S. has enacted policy (particularly tax policy) based on these myths 
shows the social construction of both markets and state actions, how each 
is centrally influenced by the other, and how these effects compound 
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unequal capital accumulation. Julia Ott, in a recent article in Dissent titled 
How Tax Policy Created the 1%, shows that for over a century, U.S. tax 
policy not only “advanced the accumulation of white wealth,” but also 
reproduced the similar problematic assumption that equated shareholding 
with proprietorship.55 Ott makes a crucial connection: the corresponding 
narrative (often told by dominant financial actors and advocates) that 
shores up the link between shareholding and corporate proprietorship is 
based on the mistaken equation of secondary securities markets with 
primary inputs and investments in a company. 
These larger cultural interpretations (and misapprehensions), Ott 
argues, are evident in comparatively lenient tax policies that favor profits 
made from the buying and selling of stocks and bonds. The problematic 
rationale for low taxes on capital gains emerges from the assumption that 
these profits are generated from direct investment in the primary, 
“productive” markets, and that they are continually re-invested to create 
jobs and fund new ventures. Key historical examples are the Congressional 
justifications and contestations around the Revenue Act of 1921, when a 
consensus emerged in Congress that investment income should be taxed 
at a “preferential or reduced tax rate” compared to regular income.56 This 
development was due in part to a national marketing campaign during 
WWI that promoted the sale of war bonds by linking “citizenship and 
investment,” specifically national and individual independence with the 
notion of investment in bonds as property ownership.57 By 1921, then, 
Congress was determined to “protect . . . the investor” (rather than seeing 
the investor as plutocrat), and “[b]ased upon this consensus, the Revenue 
Act of 1921 separated different forms of income and honored investors 
with a 12.5 percent rate on capital gains income, well below the top rate 
of 50 percent for ordinary income from wages and salaries.”58 Even after 
the Great Depression, the NYSE resisted attempts to levy taxes on the 
wealthy by continuing to capitalize on these assumptions, framing 
investment in stocks as productive of national growth and as an expression 
of “the courage of private capital.”59 Not surprisingly, this discourse was 
deployed in direct contradistinction to New Deal policies to help the poor: 
investment incentives were framed as courageous, responsible, and 
productive, while social welfare measures were characterized as the 
opposite. 
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These tax policies and preferences demonstrate the deep 
ramifications of the logic that links the buying of stocks and other 
securities and the income generated by their sale with production and, 
correspondingly, portrays the stock market as an accurate proxy for the 
work of capital and labor to establish and maintain institutions. As I 
mentioned above, modern corporations have historically depended on 
their own retained earnings generated from infusions of time, money, and 
labor from founders and stakeholders, rather than on the investments of 
shareholders in the secondary markets. And yet, financial representations 
and logic attempt to re-write this historical context. As Ott argues, such 
revisionist history has little empirical support: 
Then as now, when investors trade stocks and bonds, money passes 
from those who wish to buy to those who wish to sell. Corporations 
and others who issue securities receive nothing from these trades 
(except during an initial public offering). Those who earn capital 
gains by profitably trading stocks or bonds (or selling a home, a 
business, a barrel of oil, a derivative contract) might reinvest in new 
and promising ventures that create jobs and grow the economy. But 
history suggests they are more likely to spend those gains, or to 
reinvest them in an asset bubble.60 
The preference for capital gains, then, derives from the same fiction 
as the origin myths undergirding shareholder value primacy. The 
Presidents of the NYSE in the 1930s, Richard Whitney, and 1940s, Emil 
Schram, rallied and lobbied politicians, financial interests, and managerial 
associations, arguing that lowering capital gains taxes would lend 
“confidence to capital,” which was crucial because “free equity capital” 
would stimulate private enterprise and “achieve maximum production and 
maximum employment.”61 Ott argues, quoting the post-WWII NYSE 
Chairman Robert Boylan, that dire warnings of socialism were continually 
mobilized when critics highlighted the elitist mythologies upon which 
capital gains preferences rest: “If the capital that is required for industrial 
expansion and maintaining full employment . . . is not provided by private 
investors . . . then the alternative is Government financing.”62 Yet, as Ott 
demonstrates, “[d]espite what the NYSE claimed, corporate reinvestment 
of retained earnings continued to fund the bulk of economic expansion.”63 
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BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
Since the 1980s, Wall Street financial institutions and actors have 
engaged in a decades-long process of downsizing and restructuring 
previously stable corporations in order to transform them into financial 
assets whose earnings were largely redistributed to the very investors, 
executives, and financial advisors who advised and brokered these 
transformations. These massive shifts have played a central role in 
widening socio-economic inequality in the U.S. and were justified, in no 
small part, by the seeming righteousness of shareholder value and investor 
dominance. Given the extent to which shareholder value has been used to 
legitimize the right of dominant finance to shape what a corporation is for 
and to whom it belongs, this Article attempts to lay bare the problematic 
foundational assumptions upon which multiple shareholder value 
arguments rest. While it is important to recognize that Wall Street’s 
institutional power and access to large swaths of capital allow it to use and 
abuse shareholder value justifications for its own benefit, there is also 
something about the building blocks of shareholder value assumptions that 
renders them particularly useful for dominant financial interests. In this 
Article, I have argued that the origin story of corporate “ownership” by 
shareholders (which undergirds the key justifications for shareholder value 
primacy) is based on a series of ahistorical misrecognitions and underlying 
myths, such as the problematic assertion that shareholders provided 
original capital for the formation of modern public corporations as well as 
the deliberate conflation of primary and secondary markets. As Julia Ott 
cogently clarifies, these financial market constructs and ideas do the 
following: 
Neoliberal theory collapses any distinction between primary markets 
(where enterprises obtain funding) and secondary markets (where 
investors trade existing assets). Lumping these functions together, 
neoliberal thought identifies “investment” and “investors” 
as the sources of economic growth and progress. Corporations exist 
to maximize returns to shareholders.64 
The constructed importance of investors and the priority of 
investment in neoliberal thought, from NYSE presidents to Milton 
Friedman and Michael Jensen’s writings, played an outsized role in 
justifying and catalyzing financial influence as well as shareholder value 
primacy. What this Article attempts to unpack is the centrality of a 
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problematic concept of “ownership” to neoliberal policy and practice 
related to financialization and the financial markets. 
In the decade since the financial crisis of 2008, many scholars, social 
critics, and policymakers have investigated how and why finance 
continues to exert undue influence on corporations, nations, and 
economies after such a massive challenge to their legitimacy. I would 
argue that one of the key reasons for Wall Street’s resurgence and 
continued dominance is not only the fact that the U.S. social safety net, at 
least for the middle class, has largely been outsourced to Wall Street 
(which thus acquired the leverage to request bailouts in the name of Main 
Street), but also that the concept of “Wall Street as investor = owner” has 
not been sufficiently disputed. It is therefore crucial that we fundamentally 
challenge the concept of ownership. This would allow us to imagine what 
a post-shareholder value world might look like: What are the legal and 
policy implications of challenging shareholder ownership? What would 
our socio-economic values be? Whose interests should corporations serve?  
To think more broadly and critically, it is important to draw from 
diverse philosophies. For example, future scholarship should take 
inspiration from scholars in critical race and indigenous studies65 who have 
heterogeneously questioned the very meanings of ownership, property, 
and possession that inform mainstream Western thought, and who use their 
insights to inform studies of corporations, markets, and capitalism. Given 
that the dominant logic of “proprietary and commoditized models of social 
relations”66 as well as the initial infrastructures of accumulation in the U.S. 
were made possible by the colonization of indigenous peoples and the 
enslavement of African Americans, the very notion of ownership is 
necessarily problematic. In other words, if the very “market for land was, 
after all, predicated upon the military conquest of Indigenous peoples, 
their forced removal from the territories in question, and their de jure and 
de facto exclusion from the market through legislation explicitly designed 
to ensure Indians could not compete with white settlers when it came time 
to (re)purchase land at auction,”67 then it is incumbent upon us to question 
the politics and uneven power relations that undergird both the concept 
and the conditions of “ownership” itself. 
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